On Merger and Acquisition and Protectionism We develop a dynamic model of merger assuming a monopolistic competitive market with heterogeneous rms. We show the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium in the merger market and the conditions under which mergers lower the industry aggregate price. Most importantly, we show as our main result that merger and acquisition activities are in a sense protectionary, nonetheless they can be welfare improving

Hamid Beladi and Reza Oladi

No 6, Working Papers from College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio

Keywords: Mergers; acquisitions; trade; protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L13 L22 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2011-11-11
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