Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions

Hamid Beladi and Reza Oladi

No 16, Working Papers from College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio

Abstract: By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, we introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, we show that the partial compliance of the target country along with mild sanctions are not only equilibrium, but also Pareto superior to non-compliance and tough economic sanctions.

Keywords: Economic sanctions; sanctions game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2006-09-28
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Journal Article: Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tsa:wpaper:0046eco

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