Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser

No 19-1021, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study games in which principals simultaneously post mechanisms in the presence of several agents. We evaluate the role of principals’ communication in these settings. As in Myerson (1982), each principal may generate incomplete information among agents by sending them private signals. We show that this channel of communication, which has not been considered in standard approaches to competing mechanisms, has relevant strategic effects. Specifically, we construct an example of a complete information game in which (multiple) equilibria are sustained as in Yamashita (2010) and none of them survives in games in which all principals can send private signals to agents. The corresponding sets of equilibrium allocations are therefore disjoint. The role of private communication we document may hence call for extending the construction of Epstein and Peters (1999) to incorporate this additional element.

Keywords: Competing Mechanisms; Private Communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Private communication in competing mechanism games (2019)
Working Paper: On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games (2017)
Working Paper: On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:123148

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