The Ownership of Data
Wilfried Sand-Zantman and
Anastasios Dosis ()
No 19-1025, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
We study the effects of property rights over the use of data on market outcomes. To do so, we consider a model in which a monopolistic firm offers a service to a set of heterogeneous users. The use of the service generates valuable data, but data extraction entails a privacy cost for users. We show that both the firm and users prefer the users (the firm) to own the rights for low (high) values of data. We further discuss the robustness of our results to allowing more possible contracts for the data owner. We show that the main trade-off between the two ownership regimes is robust to these extensions.
Keywords: Ownership; Data; Imperfect Competition; Privacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D86 L12 L19 L49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07-17, Revised 2020-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-law and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:123180
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