Residual Deterrence

Daniel Garrett and Francesc Dilme

No 19-1029, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. We do so by introducing to a standard inspection framework costs that must be incurred to commence enforcement. Such costs in practice include hiring specialized staff, undertaking targeted research and coordinating personnel. We illustrate how our model can be used to address a number of policy questions regarding the optimal design of enforcement authorities.

Keywords: deterrence; reputation; switching costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Residual Deterrence (2019)
Working Paper: Residual Deterrence (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:123218

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