Motivational Ratings

Johannes Hörner and Nicolas Lambert

No 20-1134, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Performance evaluation (\rating") systems not only provide information to users but also motivate the rated worker. This paper solves for the optimal (effort-maximizing) rating within the standard career concerns framework. We prove that this rating is a linear function of past observations. The rating, however, is not a Markov process, but rather the sum of two Markov processes. We show how it combines information of different types and vintages. An increase in effort may adversely affect some (but not all) future ratings.

Keywords: Career Concerns; Mechanism Design; Ratings. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-08-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Motivational Ratings (2021)
Working Paper: Motivational Ratings (2021)
Working Paper: Motivational Ratings (2021)
Working Paper: Motivational Ratings (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:124605

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