You get what you pay for: When do Certification Programs improve Public Service Delivery?

Soeren Henn, Horacio Larreguy and John Marshall

No 20-1154, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Keywords: limited public service delivery; unobservability of investments; certification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10
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Working Paper: You get what you pay for: When do Certification Programs improve Public Service Delivery? (2020)
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