Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective

Alex Smolin and Laura Doval

No 21-1247, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study the payoffs that can arise under some information structure from an interim perspective. There is a set of types distributed according to some prior distribution and a payoff function that assigns a value to each pair of a type and a belief over the types. Any information structure induces an interim payoff profile which describes, for each type, the expected payoff under the information structure conditional on the type. We characterize the set of all interim payoff profiles consistent with some information structure. We illustrate our results through applications.

Date: 2021-09-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-isf
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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