Managers’ Productivity and Recruitment in the Public Sector: The Case of School Principals

Mounu Prem and Pablo Muñoz

No 22-1303, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Governments face many constraints in attracting talented managers to the public sector, where high-powered incentives are often absent. In this paper, we study how a civil service reform in Chile changed the effectiveness of a vital group of public sector managers, school principals. We measure principals’ e˙ectiveness using an extension of the canonical teacher value-added model and we evaluate the effect of the reform using a dfference-in-differences approach. We find that public schools appoint more effective managers after increasing the competitiveness and transparency of their se-lection process. Our result shows that better recruitment policies can enhance service provision in the public sector, despite rigid wage schemes.

Keywords: Managers; Public sector; Recruitment; School principals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Managers’ Productivity and Recruitment in the Public Sector: The Case of School Principals (2022)
Working Paper: Managers’productivity and recruitment in the public sector: the case of school principals (2021)
Working Paper: Managers' Productivity and Recruitment in the Public Sector: The Case of School Principals (2021)
Working Paper: Managers' Productivity and Labor Market: Evidence from School Principals (2020)
Working Paper: Productivity and Sectoral Allocation: The Labor Market of School Principals (2019)
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