Two-Sided Matching Without Transfers: A Unifying Empirical Framework
No 22-1340, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
This paper provides a unifying framework of one-to-one and many-to-one matching without transfers and investigates how data on realized matches can be leveraged to identify preferences of participating agents. I ﬁnd that, under parsimonious assumptions on preferences, one can only identify the joint surplus function both in the one-to-one and many-to-one case. While this negative identiﬁcation result was already established for the one-to-one case, I reconcile this ﬁnding with the recent literature showing that preferences are separately identiﬁed when having data on many-to-one matchings. I ﬁnd that these positive identiﬁcation results are mostly driven by restrictions imposed on preferences rather than the additional identiﬁcation power made available through the many-to-one structure of the data. I then show that by imposing similar restrictions on preferences, one can recover identiﬁcation of preferences both in the one-to-one and many-to-one case. Finally, I show that the additional data brought by many-to-one matchings can alternatively be used to estimate more precisely the distribution of un-observed preference heterogeneity.
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