The Economics of Transferable Patent Extensions

Pierre Dubois, Paul-Henri Moisson and Jean Tirole

No 22-1377, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Faced with a scarcity of treatments for neglected diseases, experts and governmental organizations have lately proposed to build strong pull incentives around transferable vouchers. Inventors would be granted, and allowed to sell these vouchers to pharmas desiring to extend their exclusive IP rights. However, we know little about how such “Transferable Exclusivity Extensions” fare relative to prizes, who is likely to acquire them and at what cost for society, or how the burden is shared among nations. We shed light on these questions, both from a theoretical perspective and from an empirical analysis of European data.

Keywords: Vouchers; pull mechanisms; burden sharing; administered drug prices; prizes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 L5 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-11-02, Revised 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-ipr
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The economics of transferable patent extensions (2025)
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