Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?

David Martimort and Jerome Pouyet

No 24-1501, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.

Keywords: Broadcasting rights; Upstream and downstream competition; Exclusivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-01-23, Revised 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? (2024)
Working Paper: Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:129026

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