Social learning preserves both useful and useless theories by canalizing learners’ exploration

Maxime Derex, Jean-François Bonnefon, Robert Boyd, Richard McElreath and Alex Mesoudi

No 25-1618, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: In many domains, learning from others is crucial for leveraging cumulative cultural knowledge, which encapsulates the efforts of successive generations of innovators. However, anecdotal and experimental evidence suggests that reliance on social information can reduce the exploration of the problem space. Here, we experimentally investigate the extent to which cultural transmission fosters the persistence of arbitrary solutions in a context where participants are incentivized to improve a physical system across multiple trials. Participants were exposed to various theories about the system, ranging from accurate to misleading. Our findings indicate that even under conditions conducive to exploration, the transmission of cultural knowledge canalizes learners’ focus, limiting their consideration of alternative solutions. This effect was observed in both the theories produced and the solutions attempted by participants, irrespective of the accuracy of the provided theories. These results challenge the notion that arbitrary solutions persist only when they are efficient or intuitive and underscore the significant role of cultural transmission in shaping human knowledge and technologies.

Keywords: cultural evolution; cumulative culture; innovation, cultural inertia; social learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-exp
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docu ... 2025/wp_tse_1618.pdf Full Text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:130345

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().