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The Electoral Effects of State-Sponsored Homophobia

Konstantin Bogatyrev, Tarik Abou-Chadi, Heike Klüver, Lukas F. Stoetzer and Violeta I. Haas

No 25-1628, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Do strategies of state-sponsored homophobia translate into electoral gains?While a growing body of literature documents the increasing politicization of LGBTQ- and gender-related issues by illiberal elites, little is known about the electoral effects of these strategies. We address this important question by studying whether anti-LGBTQ mobilization pays off electorally for the initiating party. Empirically, we study the adoption of anti-LGBTQ resolu-tions in many Polish municipalities prior to the 2019 parliamentary election. Using a synthetic difference-in-differences design, we find that these resolu-tions significantly depressed turnout in affected municipalities, with oppo-sition parties showing less mobilization capacity. By contrast, turnout for the incumbent Law and Justice Party increased substantially. Overall, this study’s findings are relevant for understanding the electoral consequences of both elite-led mobilization against stigmatized and discriminated groups, and policies of subnational democratic backsliding.

Keywords: LGBTQ rights; sexuality and politics; political homophobia; political competition; political participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03
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