Delegation to Artificial Intelligence can increase dishonest behaviour

Nils Köbis, Zoe Rahwan, Raluca Rilla, Bramantyo Ibrahim Supriyatno, Clara Bersch, Tamer Ajaj, Jean-François Bonnefon and Iyad Rahwan

No 25-1663, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Date: 2025-09
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Journal Article: Delegation to artificial intelligence can increase dishonest behaviour (2025)
Working Paper: Delegation to Artificial Intelligence can increase dishonest behaviour (2025)
Working Paper: Delegation to Artificial Intelligence can increase dishonest behaviour (2025)
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