Public Communication in Regime Change games

Georgy Lukyanov and Anastasia Makhmudova

No 26-1713, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study a regime change game in which the state and an opposition leader both observe the regime’s true strength and may engage in costly communication by manipulating the mean of citizens’ private signals. Each citizen then decides whether to attack the regime. From the perspective of both the state and the opposition, the size of the attack is uncertain, as the number of committed partisans—those who always attack regardless of their signal—is not observed in advance. We show that a regime on the brink of collapse optimally refrains from propaganda, while the opposition engages in counter-propaganda. The equilibrium level of counter-propaganda increases with the opposition’s benefit-cost ratio and with the precision of citizens’ private signals, and decreases with the cost of attacking.

Keywords: Global games; Signalling; Policymaker; Information asymmetry; Coordinated attack; Regime change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D84 E58 F31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:131436

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