Sharing the Cost of Global Warming

Justin Leroux and Etienne Billette de Villemeur

No 10-186, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Due to meteorological factors, the distribution of the environmental damage due to climate change bears no relationship to that of global emissions. We argue in favor of offsetting this discrepancy, and propose a "global insurance scheme" to be fincanced according to countries responsibility for climate change. Because GHG decay very slowly, we argue that the actual burden of global warming should be shared on the basis of cumulated emissions, raher than sharing the expected costs of actual emissions as in a Pigovian taxation scheme. We characterize new versions of two well-known cost-sharing schemes by adapting the responsibility theory of Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) to a context with externalities.

JEL-codes: D62 D63 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-ene and nep-env
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Related works:
Journal Article: Sharing the Cost of Global Warming (2011)
Working Paper: Sharing the Cost of Global Warming (2010)
Working Paper: Sharing the Cost of Global Warming (2010)
Working Paper: Sharing the Cost of Global Warming (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:23146

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