EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals

Giuseppe Attanasi (), Aurora García-Gallego (), Nikolaos Georgantzís () and Aldo Montesano ()

No 10-192, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games.

Keywords: Bargaining; Confirmed proposals; Confirmed agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/bee/10-192.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:23342

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2020-10-28
Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:23342