Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals
Giuseppe Attanasi (),
Aurora García-Gallego (),
Nikolaos Georgantzís () and
Aldo Montesano ()
No 10-192, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games.
Keywords: Bargaining; Confirmed proposals; Confirmed agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:23342
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