Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging

Olivier Armantier and Nicolas Treich

No 10-213, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Eliciting beliefs: Proper scoring rules, incentives, stakes and hedging (2013)
Working Paper: Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging (2010)
Working Paper: Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging (2010)
Working Paper: Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging (2010)
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