Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion

Michel Le Breton, Alban Thomas and Vera Zaporozhets ()

No 12-324, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com- mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa- ter Agencies. The theoretical model of bargaining is simulated for various risk preferences, and a reduced-form estimation of the distribution of sub- sidies is performed. We find some evidence in support of the predictions regarding the role of bargaining in decision-making for water management.

JEL-codes: D10 D64 D91 E21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07
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Working Paper: Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion (2012)
Working Paper: Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:26055

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