The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia

Doh-Shin Jeon and Domenico Menicucci

No 13-425, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper identifies strategies to build a library consortium from a long term point of view. Contrary to the conventional wisdom to build a consortium around groups of homogenous institutions (Davis, 2002), we find that libraries with similar preferences are likely to lose from building a consortium while libraries with opposite preferences almost always gain from it. Our results suggest a strong tension between a short-term strategy and a long-term strategy as long as the former dictates forming a consortium around libraries with homogenous preferences in order to gain from quantity discounts. This tension might create a "library consortium trap".

Keywords: Library Consortium; Academic Journals; Personalized Prices; Cor- relation; Multimarket contact; Level-playing Field (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 K21 L41 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08, Revised 2015-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:27443

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