Universal Intellectual Property Rights: Too Much of a Good Thing?

Emmanuelle Auriol, Sara Biancini and Rodrigo Paillacar

No 19-987, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Developing countries' incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) are studied in a model of vertical innovation. Enforcing IPR boosts export opportunities to advanced economies but slows down technological transfers and incentives to invest in R&D. Asymmetric protection of IPR, strict in the North and lax in the South, leads in many cases to a higher world level of innovation than universal enforcement. IPR enforcement is U-shaped in the relative size of the export market compared to the domestic one: rich countries and small/poor countries enforce IPR, the former to protect their innovations, the latter to access foreign markets, while large emerging countries free-ride on rich countries' technology to serve their internal demand.

Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights; Innovation; Imitation; Duopoly; Developing Countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 F15 L13 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-knm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Universal intellectual property rights: Too much of a good thing? (2019)
Working Paper: Universal intellectual property rights: Too much of a good thing? (2019)
Working Paper: Universal Intellectual Property Rights: Too Much of a Good Thing? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:27977

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