Remarks on existence and uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibria in the non-potential case

Adrien Blanchet and Guillaume Carlier

No 14-491, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This article is devoted to various methods (optimal transport, fixed-point, ordi- nary differential equations) to obtain existence and/or uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibria for games with a continuum of players with both attractive and repulsive effects. We mainly address separable situations but for which the game does not have a potential, contrary to the variational framework of [3]. We also present several nu- merical simulations which illustrate the applicability of our approach to compute Cournot-Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Continuum of players; Cournot-Nash equilibria; optimal transport; best-reply iteration; congestion; non-symmetric interactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:28214

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