Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation

Takuro Yamashita

No 14-514, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper discusses some connections among several robustness concepts of mechanisms in terms of agents' behaviors. Specifically, under certain conditions such as private values and ``rich'' interdependent values, we show that implementation in (one-round or iterative) undominated strategies, a solution concept robust to strategic uncertainty, is equivalent to Bayesian implementation with arbitrary type spaces, a solution concept robust to structural uncertainty.

Keywords: Robust implementation; Strategic and structural uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-cta and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:28371

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