Can Economic Incentives Tame Jihad? Lessons from Sudan and Chad

Jean-Paul Azam ()

No 15-564, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper uses a provocation model to explain why the initial Muslim coalitions against southern Christians broke up in Sudan and Chad. The need to cooperate was made obvious in Sudan when oil flew in a Chinese-built pipeline running through the Christian rebels’ homeland. Jihad was called off and political Islam was discarded when the rebels showed their ability to disrupt the oil flow by blowing up the pipeline. The government of Sudan had switched from African socialism to Political Islam a couple of decades before. It then imposed the Sharia Law even on the Christians as a provocation to trigger a rebellion after years of peace and to launch an ethnic cleansing campaign in the oil-rich areas. In Chad also, the initial Muslim coalition against the Christians broke up for sharing the oil money with the latter, but with a different timing.

Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-cta and nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:29179

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