Advertising competition in the French free-to-air television broadcasting industry

Marc Ivaldi and Jiekai Zhang

No 15-578, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper studies the advertising competition in the French free TV broadcasting industry, following a decision of the French anti-trust authority on the acquisition of two channels by the most active media group of the sector. After specifying a structural model of oligopoly competition of free TVs, we identify the shape and magnitude of the feedback loop between TV viewers and advertisers using French market data from March 2008 to December 2013. We implement a simple procedure to test the market conduct of TV channels, and identify that the nature of competition is of Cournot type in this industry. Finally, based on a series of competitive analysis, we conclude that the approved acquisition has not significantly affected the industry's competitiveness, and that the implemented behavioral remedies seems to be efficient in protecting the consumer surplus.

Keywords: Advertising; competition; media; TV; two-sided market; market conduct; behavioral remedies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05, Revised 2018-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-ind and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Advertising Competition in the French Free-To-Air Television Broadcasting Industry (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:29319

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