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A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities

Yinghua He, Antonio Miralles, Marek Pycia and Jianye Yan

No 15-601, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.

Keywords: Priority-based allocation; Efficiency; Stability; Incentive Compatibility; Pseudo-Market Approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 I29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2015-09, Revised 2017-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14) Track citations by RSS feed

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