The Political Economy of (De)centralization with Complementary Public Goods

Guillaume Cheikbossian

No 16-644, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper provides a political economy analysis of (de)centralization when local public goods -- with spillovers effects -- can be substitutes or complements. Depending on the degree of complementarity between local public goods, median voters strategically delegate policy to either `conservative' or to `liberal' representatives under decentralized decision-making. In the first case, it accentuates the free-rider problem in public good provision, while it mitigates it in the second case. Under centralized decision-making, the process of strategic delegation results in either too low or too much public spending, with the outcome crucially depending on the sharing of the costs of local public spending relative to the size of the spillover effects. Hence, with a common financing rule, centralization is welfare improving if and only if both public good externalities and the degree of complementarity between local public goods are both relatively large.

Keywords: (De)centralization; Local Public Goods; Complements; Strategic Delegation; Spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The political economy of (De)centralization with complementary public goods (2016)
Working Paper: The political economy of (de)centralization with complementary public goods (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:30433

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