Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié

No 17-788, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We rst provide a general necessary and sucient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprotable. We then use this result to characterize, for an active market, a unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by a market tari making additional trades with an entrant unprotable. Motivated by the recursive structure of this allocation, we nally show that it emerges as the essentially unique equilibrium outcome of a discriminatory ascending auction. These results yield sharp predictions for competitive nonexclusive markets..

Keywords: Adverse Selection; Entry-Proofness; Discriminatory Pricing; Nonexclusive; Markets; Ascending Auctions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03, Revised 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ias and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection (2021)
Working Paper: Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection (2021)
Working Paper: Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:31582

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