Career Concerns with Exponential Learning
Alessandro Bonatti () and
No 17-793, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. For any wage, the agent works too little, too late. Under short-term contracts, effort and wages are single-peaked with seniority, due to the strategic substitutability of effort levels at different times. Both delay and underprovision of effort worsen if effort is observable. Commitment to wages by competing firms mitigates these inefficiencies. In that case, the optimal contract features piecewise constant wages and severance pay.
Keywords: career concerns; experimentation; career paths; up-or-out; reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hrm and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Career concerns with exponential learning (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:31604
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