God insures those who pay?Formal insurance and religious offerings in Ghana
Emmanuelle Auriol (),
Eva Raiber () and
No 17-831, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
This paper presents experimental evidence exploring how insurance might be a motive for religious donations by members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana. We ran- domize enrollment into a commercially available funeral insurance policy and let church members allocate money between themselves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled in insurance give significantly less money to their own churches. At the same time, enrollment in insurance reduces giving towards other spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religious based insurance. The implications of the model and the results of the dictator games suggest that adherents perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an interventionist God. Survey results suggest that community-based material insurance is also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel.
Keywords: economics of religion; informal insurance; charitable giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D14 G22 O12 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias, nep-mfd and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:31915
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