Collusion between two-sided platforms
Yassine Lefouili and
Joana Pinho
No 18-894, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Abstract:
We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.
Keywords: Collusion; Two-sided markets; Cross-group externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02, Revised 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
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Journal Article: Collusion between two-sided platforms (2020) 
Working Paper: Collusion between two-sided platforms (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:32485
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