An Econometric Model of Network Formation with an Application to Board Interlocks between Firms
No 17-898, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
The paper provides a framework for partially identifying the parameters governing agents’ preferences in a static game of network formation with interdependent link decisions, complete information, and transferable or non-transferable payoffs. The proposed methodology attenuates the computational difficulties arising at the inference stage - due to the huge number of moment inequalities characterising the sharp identified set and the impossibility of brute-force calculating the integrals entering them - by decomposing the network formation game into local games which have a structure similar to entry games and are such that the network formation game is in equilibrium if and only if each local game is in equilibrium. As an empirical illustration of the developed procedure, the paper estimates firms’ incentives for having executives sitting on the board of competitors, using Italian data.
Keywords: network formation; pure strategy Nash equilibrium; pairwise stability; multiple equilibria; partial identification; moment inequalities; local games; board interlocks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C1 C57 C62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ecm and nep-gth
Date: 2018-03, Revised 2018-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docu ... p_tse_898revised.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:32550
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().