Multitasking, Competition and Provider Payment

Karen Eggleston

No 101, Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University from Department of Economics, Tufts University

Abstract: Many important dimensions of quality health care are difficult to observe, monitor, and motivate. This paper examines how competition among providers interacts with payment system incentives when the allocation of provider effort among multiple such dimensions or ‘tasks’ is noncontractible. The framework highlights that an optimal provider payment system, including optimal risk adjustment, should take account of provider multitasking.

Keywords: payment incentives; competition; multitasking; capitation; managed care; rationing; risk adjustment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-hea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0101

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