Public Opinion and the Dynamics of Reform

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand

No 408, Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University from Department of Economics, Tufts University

Abstract: Why do economic reforms that are proceeding successfully often run aground? In this paper we show that there might arise circumstances where the initial success of reform might result in it running into a political impasse. We suggest that the key might lie in the e?ect that the reform process has on the balance of political power. In particular, if initially successful reforms change the balance of political power in such a way as to make future redistribution less likely, then public opinion may turn against reform. Thus, in some sense, an initially successful reform may well end up sowing the seeds of its own destruction.

Keywords: Political Economy; Economic Reform; Public Opinion; Redistribution; Compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O20 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Working Paper: Public Opinion and the Dynamics of Reform (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0408

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