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Empathy, Sympathy, and Tax Compliance

Roberta Calvet () and James Alm ()
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Roberta Calvet: Department of Business Management and Communication, Lesley University

No 1310, Working Papers from Tulane University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the effect of "empathy" and "sympathy" on tax compliance. We run a series of laboratory experiments in which we observe the subjects' decisions in a series of one-shot tax compliance games presented at once and with no immediate feedback. Importantly, we employ methods to identify subjects' sympathy, such as the Davis Empathic Concern Scale and questions about frequency of prosocial behaviors; we also use priming in order to promote subjects' empathy. Our results suggest that the presence of sympathy in most cases encourages more tax compliance. Our results also suggest that priming to elicit empathy also has a positive impact on tax compliance. These results support the inclusion of noneconomic factors in the analysis of tax compliance behavior.

Keywords: Tax evasion; Emotions; Morality; Identity; Behavioral economics; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-iue, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://repec.tulane.edu/RePEc/pdf/tul1310.pdf First Version, February 2013 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Empathy, sympathy, and tax compliance (2014) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tul:wpaper:1310

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