Suddenly Married: Joint Taxation And The Labor Supply Of Same-Sex Married Couples After U.S. v. Windsor
Elliott Isaac ()
No 1809, Working Papers from Tulane University, Department of Economics
Joint taxation can exacerbate the deadweight loss of taxation due to labor supply responses, but evidence is scarce. I estimate the efficiency costs and labor supply effects of joint taxation in the United States by leveraging tax variation created by federal same-sex marriage recognition following the 2013 United States v. Windsor Supreme Court ruling. I find moderate hours responses among primary earners and larger labor force participation responses among secondary earners. My findings suggest that joint taxation is less efficient and generates less tax revenue than individual taxation, and that lowering tax rates for secondary earners could improve efficiency.
Keywords: taxation; labor supply; same-sex marriage; sufficient statistics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 H21 H24 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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