Marriage, Divorce, and Tax and Transfer Policy
No 1810, Working Papers from Tulane University, Department of Economics
I use variation from the 1990s in the Earned Income Tax Credit and welfare reform to estimate the effects on marrying and divorcing. I examine flows into and out of marriage, use test scores to predict who is most likely to be affected by the policy changes, and employ a flexible functional form to estimate heterogeneous effects. I find that low-earning single parents are more likely to marry due to the EITC expansion and lower welfare generosity, while mid-earning married parents are less likely to divorce and high-earning married parents are more likely to divorce due to the EITC expansion.
Keywords: taxation; marriage; divorce; EITC; TANF; AFDC (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 H24 H53 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-pbe
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