Employees’ Performance Variation over Fixed-Term Contracts - Evidence from the National Hockey League

Luca Furmaco (), N. Longley, A. Palermo and Giambattista Rossi ()
Additional contact information
Luca Furmaco: Department of Economics and the Murphy Institute, Tulane University, IZA, GLO
N. Longley: Department of Business, Nevada State College
A. Palermo: Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union

No 2107, Working Papers from Tulane University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We investigate whether employees vary their performance during fixed-term contracts. We follow National Hockey League players’ performance over ten seasons. We use a two-stage least square fixed effect model to address empirical limitations in previous studies. We find that players’ performance varies at the end of the contract depending on ability, tenure, and (geographical) willingness to move. In particular, long-tenure and low-ability short-tenure workers vary their performance, depending on their continent of origin; these results might be due to different willingness to move, at different stages of players’ career.

Keywords: fixed-term contracts; incentives; shirking behavior; strategic behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J24 J33 M52 Z22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-cul, nep-hrm, nep-lma and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.tulane.edu/RePEc/pdf/tul2107.pdf First Version, May 2021 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tul:wpaper:2107

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Tulane University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kerui Geng ().