Board Composition, Political Connections and Performance in State-Owned Enterprises

Anna Menozzi, María Gutiérrez Urtiaga () and Davide Vannoni
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María Gutiérrez Urtiaga: Departamento de Economía de la Impresa, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

No 9, Working papers from Former Department of Economics and Public Finance "G. Prato", University of Torino

Abstract: This paper analyses the effects of board composition on the behaviour and performance of a sample of 114 Italian local public utilities, for which information about 1630 directors during 1994-2004 has been collected. This period is particularly interesting because of the legal changes that forced many firms to alter their juridical form and allowed the entrance of private investors. We investigate whether board size and/or board composition do affect decisions about employment and how they ultimately impact on performance. Our main findings indicate that politically connected directors, representing the state or the local municipality, dominate boards of directors in the Italian public utilities in the period under investigation. Politically connected directors exert a positive and significant effect on employment, while they impact negatively on performance.

Keywords: board size; board composition; politicians; local public utilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 H42 H82 J45 K23 L25 L33 L97 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2010-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.bemservizi.unito.it/repec/tur/wpaper/n9.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Board composition, political connections, and performance in state-owned enterprises (2012)
Working Paper: Board Composition, Political Connections and Performance in State-Owned Enterprises (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tur:wpaper:09

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