Strategic Announcements of Reference Points in Disputes and Litigations
Andrea Gallice ()
No 3, Working papers from Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino
This note shows how the frequent occurrence of seeing exceedingly high claims in disputes and litigations can be rationalized by a model in which claimants display reference dependent preferences, expect the judge to use a generalized social welfare function, and strategically announce their reference points.
Keywords: reference points; claims; litigations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D63 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bemservizi.unito.it/repec/tur/wpapnw/m3.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Strategic announcements of reference points in disputes and litigations (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tur:wpapnw:003
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working papers from Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Daniele Pennesi ().