Decentralization, Vertical Fiscal Imbalance, and Political Selection

Massimo Bordignon (), Matteo Gamalerio () and Gilberto Turati ()
Additional contact information
Matteo Gamalerio: Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

No 25, Working papers from Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino

Abstract: In a career-concern model of politics with endogenous candidacy and different types of politicians, following a decentralization reform, politicians with different skills are elected in municipalities characterized by different levels of autonomous resources. As an effect, consumer welfare increases only, or mainly, in richer municipalities. We test these predictions by exploiting the differentiated reduction in Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in Italian municipalities, due to the strong difference in the tax base, following the decentralization reforms of the '90s. Results strongly support our predictions and are robust to several alternative stories.

Keywords: decentralization; vertical ?scal imbalance; quality of politicians (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 73 pages
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eur, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.bemservizi.unito.it/repec/tur/wpapnw/m25.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Decentralization, Vertical Fiscal Imbalance, and Political Selection (2013)
Working Paper: Decentralization, Vertical Fiscal Imbalance, and Political Selection (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tur:wpapnw:025

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