The Impact of Centralization, Corruption and Institutional Quality on Procurement Prices: An Application to Pharmaceutical Purchasing in Italy

Simona Baldi (simobaldi@gmail.com) and Davide Vannoni
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Simona Baldi: ART- Transport Regulation Authority, Italy

No 29, Working papers from Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino

Abstract: This paper deals with the open issue about the choice between a centralized versus a decentralized public procurement strategy. Using a unique dataset on tender prices of selected drugs for hospital usage awarded by a sample of 52 Italian local health service providers (ASLs) between 2009 and 2012, we test which procurement system (centralized, decentralized or hybrid) performs better. Controlling for several covariates, we always find that centralized and hybrid procurers pay lower prices as compared to decentralized units. Moreover, our results show that in areas in which corruption is higher or, more generally, institutional quality is lower, the effect of centralization in negotiating lower prices is much stronger, with savings that can reach also 50 percent of the price paid by ASLs that procure on their own.

Keywords: Public procurement; Centralization; Decentralization; Pharmaceutical spending. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H57 H83 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2015-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur
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http://www.bemservizi.unito.it/repec/tur/wpapnw/m29.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Impact of Centralization, Corruption and Institutional Quality on Procurement Prices: An Application to Pharmaceutical Purchasing in Italy (2014)
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