Self-Serving Biased Reference Points in Bankruptcy Problems

Andrea Gallice

No 67, Working papers from Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino

Abstract: I formalize the notion of self-serving bias within the framework of reference-dependent preferences. Self-serving bias affects agents' expectations in a systematic way and, through this channel, it influences their reference points. I then apply the model to bankruptcy problems and provide a ranking of standard allocative rules on the basis of the level of welfare that they generate.

Keywords: Self-serving bias; Reference dependent preferences; Bankruptcy problems. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2020-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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