A simple microfoundation for the utilization of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team

Benoît Le Maux and Yvon Rocaboy

Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS from Condorcet Center for political Economy

Abstract: We propose a simple non-cooperative game model where two fragmented teams compete to increase their performance. The theoretical framework is based on the theory of conflict. We show that depending on the value of a parameter in the model, the power of the competing teams may be expressed as a function of well-known fragmentation indexes: the Herfindhal-Hirschman index, the Laakso-Taagepera index, the Best shot index and the Weakest-link index.

Keywords: Contest success function; Fragmentation; Herfindhal-Hirschman index; Laakso-Taagepera index; Best shot index; Weakest-link index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: A simple microfoundation for the utilization of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team (2012)
Working Paper: A simple microfoundation for the utilization of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team (2012)
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