The Dual Political Legislation Cycle in France
Fabio Padovano () and
Nicolas Gavoille ()
Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS from Condorcet Center for political Economy
This paper tests the Political Legislation Cycle theory on French data. The theory predicts a peak of legislative production in the pre-electoral period, when the legislator increases voters’ utility in order to be reelected. France is unique in that two elections set up the pace of political life: the presidential and the legislative elections which potentially generate a dual legislation cycle. A hierarchical Poisson model is implemented on a sample containing the monthly legislative production from January 1959 to March 2012. We found that 1) a dual cycle of the production of laws emerges, following both the presidential and the legislative elections, 2) since the constitutional reform of 2000, which synchronized the two elections, the magnitude of the cycle increased, and 3) the President of the Republic does not have an impact on the legislative production, but relies on the government.
Keywords: Political Legislation Cycle; Economic theory of legislation; Political Budget Cycle; Hierarchical Poisson regression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 C49 H61 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01, Revised 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://ged.univ-rennes1.fr/nuxeo/site/esupversion ... 9e-97e0-75a1ea0377de (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Legislative Cycles in Semipresidential Systems (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2013-02-ccr
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) - Faculty of Economics, 7 place Hoche, 35065 Rennes Cedex - France
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS from Condorcet Center for political Economy CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) – Faculty of Economics, 7 place Hoche, 35065 RENNES Cedex. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by GERMAIN Lucie ().