Electoral competition and political selection: An analysis of the activity of French deputies, 1958-2012
Nicolas Gavoille () and
Marijn Verschelde ()
Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS from Condorcet Center for political Economy
In this paper, we study the relation between electoral competition and po-litical selection, using a unique dataset containing detailed yearly information about members of the French National Assembly from 1958 to 2012. First, we innovate by using activity as a proxy for politicians’ quality. As we gathered information on the many aspects of deputies’ individual work, we use a non-parametric composite indicator of deputy activity that fully acknowledges the multidimensional nature of parliamentary work. Second, we do not impose any assumption about the relationship between electoral competition and political selection by using a fully nonparametric framework. Third, this method allows studying the evolution of the relationship between electoral competition and political selection over time. Overall, our results show that deputies elected in apriori contested districts have a higher overall activity, with the intensity of this relationship reaching its peak in the 80’s but constantly decreasing since then.
Keywords: Competition; Election; Political Selection; Kernel Regression; Nonparametric Econometrics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J45 C14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Electoral competition and political selection: An analysis of the activity of French deputies, 1958–2012 (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2016-02-ccr
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