Is beauty defined by victors? An analysis of colonial sites of the UNESCO WHL

Martina Dattilo, Fabio Padovano and Yvon Rocaboy
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Martina Dattilo: CREM-CNRS, University of Rennes 1

Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS from Condorcet Center for political Economy

Abstract: Some public choice and cultural economics scholars have argued that Europe is over-represented in the UNESCO World Heritage List (WHL), because of a superior ability to impose aesthetic standards that drive the choice of sites candidate to the WHL. We address this issue by examining the perceived quality of sites in countries where these can be either indigenous or European-like (colonial). The quality of sites is computed both as the sum of criteria of Outstanding Universal Value and by a textual analysis of the reports of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS). These evaluations are mainly driven by aesthetic standards as they are made at a stage preceding the lobbying process for inclusion of the sites in the WHL. The estimates point out that neither differences in quality, nor in the probability of inscription, exist between colonial and native sites, suggesting that ICOMOS experts are impartial.

Keywords: UNESCO World Heritage List; international organizations; measurement of quality; cultural capital; colonization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F53 H87 L15 O19 Z11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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