EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Network Cooperation and incentives within online communities

Godefroy DangNguyen and Thierry Pénard ()
Additional contact information
Godefroy DangNguyen: ENST-B

Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to understand the rationale of cooperation within online sharing communities. How can we explain the extent of cooperative interactions between anonymous distant Internet users ? We build a game theoretic framework to study the exchange of services within virtual community like in a peer-to-peer network. We show that the coexistence of contributors and free-riders is often a stable situation. We also examine the optimal incentive mechanisms to stimulate contributions by community members.

Keywords: Online communities; Internet; free riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mkt, nep-net and nep-soc
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://ged.univ-rennes1.fr/nuxeo/site/esupversion ... 03-9000-9811998b907d (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Network cooperation and incentives within online communities (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tut:cremwp:200601

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) - Faculty of Economics, 7 place Hoche, 35065 Rennes Cedex - France

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) – Faculty of Economics, 7 place Hoche, 35065 RENNES Cedex. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CODA-POIREY Hélène ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-12
Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:200601