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Fiscal Policies and Trade: On the existence of Nash equilibria

Abderrahmane Ziad and Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS

Abstract: This paper studies the existence of a fiscal Nash equilibrium in a multi-country model of trade where the relative prices are the channels of transmission of scal policies between countries. We stipulate the necessary conditions on goods, consumptions and trade that allow for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the fiscal game. In the particular case of homotethic utility functions, we show that conditions on the shape and the degree of the curvature of the relative prices functions are sufficient to guarantee the existence of the Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Fiscal policy; Trade; Nash equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tut:cremwp:201112

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